| /* |
| * RISC-V Emulation Helpers for QEMU. |
| * |
| * Copyright (c) 2016-2017 Sagar Karandikar, sagark@eecs.berkeley.edu |
| * Copyright (c) 2017-2018 SiFive, Inc. |
| * Copyright (c) 2022 VRULL GmbH |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
| * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, |
| * version 2 or later, as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
| * |
| * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
| * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
| * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for |
| * more details. |
| * |
| * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with |
| * this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "qemu/osdep.h" |
| #include "cpu.h" |
| #include "internals.h" |
| #include "exec/exec-all.h" |
| #include "exec/cpu_ldst.h" |
| #include "exec/helper-proto.h" |
| |
| /* Exceptions processing helpers */ |
| G_NORETURN void riscv_raise_exception(CPURISCVState *env, |
| uint32_t exception, uintptr_t pc) |
| { |
| CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); |
| cs->exception_index = exception; |
| cpu_loop_exit_restore(cs, pc); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_raise_exception(CPURISCVState *env, uint32_t exception) |
| { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, exception, 0); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_csrr(CPURISCVState *env, int csr) |
| { |
| /* |
| * The seed CSR must be accessed with a read-write instruction. A |
| * read-only instruction such as CSRRS/CSRRC with rs1=x0 or CSRRSI/ |
| * CSRRCI with uimm=0 will raise an illegal instruction exception. |
| */ |
| if (csr == CSR_SEED) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong val = 0; |
| RISCVException ret = riscv_csrrw(env, csr, &val, 0, 0); |
| |
| if (ret != RISCV_EXCP_NONE) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, ret, GETPC()); |
| } |
| return val; |
| } |
| |
| void helper_csrw(CPURISCVState *env, int csr, target_ulong src) |
| { |
| target_ulong mask = env->xl == MXL_RV32 ? UINT32_MAX : (target_ulong)-1; |
| RISCVException ret = riscv_csrrw(env, csr, NULL, src, mask); |
| |
| if (ret != RISCV_EXCP_NONE) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, ret, GETPC()); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_csrrw(CPURISCVState *env, int csr, |
| target_ulong src, target_ulong write_mask) |
| { |
| target_ulong val = 0; |
| RISCVException ret = riscv_csrrw(env, csr, &val, src, write_mask); |
| |
| if (ret != RISCV_EXCP_NONE) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, ret, GETPC()); |
| } |
| return val; |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_csrr_i128(CPURISCVState *env, int csr) |
| { |
| Int128 rv = int128_zero(); |
| RISCVException ret = riscv_csrrw_i128(env, csr, &rv, |
| int128_zero(), |
| int128_zero()); |
| |
| if (ret != RISCV_EXCP_NONE) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, ret, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| env->retxh = int128_gethi(rv); |
| return int128_getlo(rv); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_csrw_i128(CPURISCVState *env, int csr, |
| target_ulong srcl, target_ulong srch) |
| { |
| RISCVException ret = riscv_csrrw_i128(env, csr, NULL, |
| int128_make128(srcl, srch), |
| UINT128_MAX); |
| |
| if (ret != RISCV_EXCP_NONE) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, ret, GETPC()); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_csrrw_i128(CPURISCVState *env, int csr, |
| target_ulong srcl, target_ulong srch, |
| target_ulong maskl, target_ulong maskh) |
| { |
| Int128 rv = int128_zero(); |
| RISCVException ret = riscv_csrrw_i128(env, csr, &rv, |
| int128_make128(srcl, srch), |
| int128_make128(maskl, maskh)); |
| |
| if (ret != RISCV_EXCP_NONE) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, ret, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| env->retxh = int128_gethi(rv); |
| return int128_getlo(rv); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * check_zicbo_envcfg |
| * |
| * Raise virtual exceptions and illegal instruction exceptions for |
| * Zicbo[mz] instructions based on the settings of [mhs]envcfg as |
| * specified in section 2.5.1 of the CMO specification. |
| */ |
| static void check_zicbo_envcfg(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong envbits, |
| uintptr_t ra) |
| { |
| #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY |
| if ((env->priv < PRV_M) && !get_field(env->menvcfg, envbits)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, ra); |
| } |
| |
| if (env->virt_enabled && |
| (((env->priv <= PRV_S) && !get_field(env->henvcfg, envbits)) || |
| ((env->priv < PRV_S) && !get_field(env->senvcfg, envbits)))) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, ra); |
| } |
| |
| if ((env->priv < PRV_S) && !get_field(env->senvcfg, envbits)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, ra); |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| void helper_cbo_zero(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong address) |
| { |
| RISCVCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); |
| uint16_t cbozlen = cpu->cfg.cboz_blocksize; |
| int mmu_idx = riscv_env_mmu_index(env, false); |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| void *mem; |
| |
| check_zicbo_envcfg(env, MENVCFG_CBZE, ra); |
| |
| /* Mask off low-bits to align-down to the cache-block. */ |
| address &= ~(cbozlen - 1); |
| |
| /* |
| * cbo.zero requires MMU_DATA_STORE access. Do a probe_write() |
| * to raise any exceptions, including PMP. |
| */ |
| mem = probe_write(env, address, cbozlen, mmu_idx, ra); |
| |
| if (likely(mem)) { |
| memset(mem, 0, cbozlen); |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * This means that we're dealing with an I/O page. Section 4.2 |
| * of cmobase v1.0.1 says: |
| * |
| * "Cache-block zero instructions store zeros independently |
| * of whether data from the underlying memory locations are |
| * cacheable." |
| * |
| * Write zeros in address + cbozlen regardless of not being |
| * a RAM page. |
| */ |
| for (int i = 0; i < cbozlen; i++) { |
| cpu_stb_mmuidx_ra(env, address + i, 0, mmu_idx, ra); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * check_zicbom_access |
| * |
| * Check access permissions (LOAD, STORE or FETCH as specified in |
| * section 2.5.2 of the CMO specification) for Zicbom, raising |
| * either store page-fault (non-virtualized) or store guest-page |
| * fault (virtualized). |
| */ |
| static void check_zicbom_access(CPURISCVState *env, |
| target_ulong address, |
| uintptr_t ra) |
| { |
| RISCVCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); |
| int mmu_idx = riscv_env_mmu_index(env, false); |
| uint16_t cbomlen = cpu->cfg.cbom_blocksize; |
| void *phost; |
| int ret; |
| |
| /* Mask off low-bits to align-down to the cache-block. */ |
| address &= ~(cbomlen - 1); |
| |
| /* |
| * Section 2.5.2 of cmobase v1.0.1: |
| * |
| * "A cache-block management instruction is permitted to |
| * access the specified cache block whenever a load instruction |
| * or store instruction is permitted to access the corresponding |
| * physical addresses. If neither a load instruction nor store |
| * instruction is permitted to access the physical addresses, |
| * but an instruction fetch is permitted to access the physical |
| * addresses, whether a cache-block management instruction is |
| * permitted to access the cache block is UNSPECIFIED." |
| */ |
| ret = probe_access_flags(env, address, cbomlen, MMU_DATA_LOAD, |
| mmu_idx, true, &phost, ra); |
| if (ret != TLB_INVALID_MASK) { |
| /* Success: readable */ |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Since not readable, must be writable. On failure, store |
| * fault/store guest amo fault will be raised by |
| * riscv_cpu_tlb_fill(). PMP exceptions will be caught |
| * there as well. |
| */ |
| probe_write(env, address, cbomlen, mmu_idx, ra); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_cbo_clean_flush(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong address) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| check_zicbo_envcfg(env, MENVCFG_CBCFE, ra); |
| check_zicbom_access(env, address, ra); |
| |
| /* We don't emulate the cache-hierarchy, so we're done. */ |
| } |
| |
| void helper_cbo_inval(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong address) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| check_zicbo_envcfg(env, MENVCFG_CBIE, ra); |
| check_zicbom_access(env, address, ra); |
| |
| /* We don't emulate the cache-hierarchy, so we're done. */ |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY |
| |
| target_ulong helper_sret(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| uint64_t mstatus; |
| target_ulong prev_priv, prev_virt; |
| |
| if (!(env->priv >= PRV_S)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong retpc = env->sepc; |
| if (!riscv_has_ext(env, RVC) && (retpc & 0x3)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_INST_ADDR_MIS, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| if (get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_TSR) && !(env->priv >= PRV_M)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| if (env->virt_enabled && get_field(env->hstatus, HSTATUS_VTSR)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| mstatus = env->mstatus; |
| prev_priv = get_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_SPP); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_SIE, |
| get_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_SPIE)); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_SPIE, 1); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_SPP, PRV_U); |
| if (env->priv_ver >= PRIV_VERSION_1_12_0) { |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPRV, 0); |
| } |
| env->mstatus = mstatus; |
| |
| if (riscv_has_ext(env, RVH) && !env->virt_enabled) { |
| /* We support Hypervisor extensions and virtulisation is disabled */ |
| target_ulong hstatus = env->hstatus; |
| |
| prev_virt = get_field(hstatus, HSTATUS_SPV); |
| |
| hstatus = set_field(hstatus, HSTATUS_SPV, 0); |
| |
| env->hstatus = hstatus; |
| |
| if (prev_virt) { |
| riscv_cpu_swap_hypervisor_regs(env); |
| } |
| |
| riscv_cpu_set_virt_enabled(env, prev_virt); |
| } |
| |
| riscv_cpu_set_mode(env, prev_priv); |
| |
| return retpc; |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_mret(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| if (!(env->priv >= PRV_M)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong retpc = env->mepc; |
| if (!riscv_has_ext(env, RVC) && (retpc & 0x3)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_INST_ADDR_MIS, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t mstatus = env->mstatus; |
| target_ulong prev_priv = get_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPP); |
| |
| if (riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->pmp && |
| !pmp_get_num_rules(env) && (prev_priv != PRV_M)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_INST_ACCESS_FAULT, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong prev_virt = get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_MPV) && |
| (prev_priv != PRV_M); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MIE, |
| get_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPIE)); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPIE, 1); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPP, |
| riscv_has_ext(env, RVU) ? PRV_U : PRV_M); |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPV, 0); |
| if ((env->priv_ver >= PRIV_VERSION_1_12_0) && (prev_priv != PRV_M)) { |
| mstatus = set_field(mstatus, MSTATUS_MPRV, 0); |
| } |
| env->mstatus = mstatus; |
| riscv_cpu_set_mode(env, prev_priv); |
| |
| if (riscv_has_ext(env, RVH)) { |
| if (prev_virt) { |
| riscv_cpu_swap_hypervisor_regs(env); |
| } |
| |
| riscv_cpu_set_virt_enabled(env, prev_virt); |
| } |
| |
| return retpc; |
| } |
| |
| void helper_wfi(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); |
| bool rvs = riscv_has_ext(env, RVS); |
| bool prv_u = env->priv == PRV_U; |
| bool prv_s = env->priv == PRV_S; |
| |
| if (((prv_s || (!rvs && prv_u)) && get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_TW)) || |
| (rvs && prv_u && !env->virt_enabled)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } else if (env->virt_enabled && |
| (prv_u || (prv_s && get_field(env->hstatus, HSTATUS_VTW)))) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, GETPC()); |
| } else { |
| cs->halted = 1; |
| cs->exception_index = EXCP_HLT; |
| cpu_loop_exit(cs); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void helper_wrs_nto(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| if (env->virt_enabled && (env->priv == PRV_S || env->priv == PRV_U) && |
| get_field(env->hstatus, HSTATUS_VTW) && |
| !get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_TW)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, GETPC()); |
| } else if (env->priv != PRV_M && get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_TW)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void helper_tlb_flush(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); |
| if (!env->virt_enabled && |
| (env->priv == PRV_U || |
| (env->priv == PRV_S && get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_TVM)))) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } else if (env->virt_enabled && |
| (env->priv == PRV_U || get_field(env->hstatus, HSTATUS_VTVM))) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, GETPC()); |
| } else { |
| tlb_flush(cs); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void helper_tlb_flush_all(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); |
| tlb_flush_all_cpus_synced(cs); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_hyp_tlb_flush(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); |
| |
| if (env->virt_enabled) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| if (env->priv == PRV_M || |
| (env->priv == PRV_S && !env->virt_enabled)) { |
| tlb_flush(cs); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_hyp_gvma_tlb_flush(CPURISCVState *env) |
| { |
| if (env->priv == PRV_S && !env->virt_enabled && |
| get_field(env->mstatus, MSTATUS_TVM)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| helper_hyp_tlb_flush(env); |
| } |
| |
| static int check_access_hlsv(CPURISCVState *env, bool x, uintptr_t ra) |
| { |
| if (env->priv == PRV_M) { |
| /* always allowed */ |
| } else if (env->virt_enabled) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_VIRT_INSTRUCTION_FAULT, ra); |
| } else if (env->priv == PRV_U && !get_field(env->hstatus, HSTATUS_HU)) { |
| riscv_raise_exception(env, RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST, ra); |
| } |
| |
| int mode = get_field(env->hstatus, HSTATUS_SPVP); |
| if (!x && mode == PRV_S && get_field(env->vsstatus, MSTATUS_SUM)) { |
| mode = MMUIdx_S_SUM; |
| } |
| return mode | MMU_2STAGE_BIT; |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_hyp_hlv_bu(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_UB, mmu_idx); |
| |
| return cpu_ldb_mmu(env, addr, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_hyp_hlv_hu(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUW, mmu_idx); |
| |
| return cpu_ldw_mmu(env, addr, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_hyp_hlv_wu(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUL, mmu_idx); |
| |
| return cpu_ldl_mmu(env, addr, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_hyp_hlv_d(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUQ, mmu_idx); |
| |
| return cpu_ldq_mmu(env, addr, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_hyp_hsv_b(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr, target_ulong val) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_UB, mmu_idx); |
| |
| cpu_stb_mmu(env, addr, val, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_hyp_hsv_h(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr, target_ulong val) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUW, mmu_idx); |
| |
| cpu_stw_mmu(env, addr, val, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_hyp_hsv_w(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr, target_ulong val) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUL, mmu_idx); |
| |
| cpu_stl_mmu(env, addr, val, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| void helper_hyp_hsv_d(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr, target_ulong val) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, false, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUQ, mmu_idx); |
| |
| cpu_stq_mmu(env, addr, val, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * TODO: These implementations are not quite correct. They perform the |
| * access using execute permission just fine, but the final PMP check |
| * is supposed to have read permission as well. Without replicating |
| * a fair fraction of cputlb.c, fixing this requires adding new mmu_idx |
| * which would imply that exact check in tlb_fill. |
| */ |
| target_ulong helper_hyp_hlvx_hu(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, true, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUW, mmu_idx); |
| |
| return cpu_ldw_code_mmu(env, addr, oi, GETPC()); |
| } |
| |
| target_ulong helper_hyp_hlvx_wu(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong addr) |
| { |
| uintptr_t ra = GETPC(); |
| int mmu_idx = check_access_hlsv(env, true, ra); |
| MemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_TEUL, mmu_idx); |
| |
| return cpu_ldl_code_mmu(env, addr, oi, ra); |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */ |