| Recommendations for KVM CPU model configuration on x86 hosts |
| ============================================================ |
| |
| The information that follows provides recommendations for configuring |
| CPU models on x86 hosts. The goals are to maximise performance, while |
| protecting guest OS against various CPU hardware flaws, and optionally |
| enabling live migration between hosts with heterogeneous CPU models. |
| |
| |
| Two ways to configure CPU models with QEMU / KVM |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| (1) **Host passthrough** |
| |
| This passes the host CPU model features, model, stepping, exactly to |
| the guest. Note that KVM may filter out some host CPU model features |
| if they cannot be supported with virtualization. Live migration is |
| unsafe when this mode is used as libvirt / QEMU cannot guarantee a |
| stable CPU is exposed to the guest across hosts. This is the |
| recommended CPU to use, provided live migration is not required. |
| |
| (2) **Named model** |
| |
| QEMU comes with a number of predefined named CPU models, that |
| typically refer to specific generations of hardware released by |
| Intel and AMD. These allow the guest VMs to have a degree of |
| isolation from the host CPU, allowing greater flexibility in live |
| migrating between hosts with differing hardware. @end table |
| |
| In both cases, it is possible to optionally add or remove individual CPU |
| features, to alter what is presented to the guest by default. |
| |
| Libvirt supports a third way to configure CPU models known as "Host |
| model". This uses the QEMU "Named model" feature, automatically picking |
| a CPU model that is similar the host CPU, and then adding extra features |
| to approximate the host model as closely as possible. This does not |
| guarantee the CPU family, stepping, etc will precisely match the host |
| CPU, as they would with "Host passthrough", but gives much of the |
| benefit of passthrough, while making live migration safe. |
| |
| |
| ABI compatibility levels for CPU models |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The x86_64 architecture has a number of `ABI compatibility levels`_ |
| defined. Traditionally most operating systems and toolchains would |
| only target the original baseline ABI. It is expected that in |
| future OS and toolchains are likely to target newer ABIs. The |
| table that follows illustrates which ABI compatibility levels |
| can be satisfied by the QEMU CPU models. Note that the table only |
| lists the long term stable CPU model versions (eg Haswell-v4). |
| In addition to what is listed, there are also many CPU model |
| aliases which resolve to a different CPU model version, |
| depending on the machine type is in use. |
| |
| .. _ABI compatibility levels: https://gitlab.com/x86-psABIs/x86-64-ABI/ |
| |
| .. csv-table:: x86-64 ABI compatibility levels |
| :file: cpu-models-x86-abi.csv |
| :widths: 40,15,15,15,15 |
| :header-rows: 2 |
| |
| |
| Preferred CPU models for Intel x86 hosts |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The following CPU models are preferred for use on Intel hosts. |
| Administrators / applications are recommended to use the CPU model that |
| matches the generation of the host CPUs in use. In a deployment with a |
| mixture of host CPU models between machines, if live migration |
| compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible |
| across all desired hosts. |
| |
| ``Cascadelake-Server``, ``Cascadelake-Server-noTSX`` |
| Intel Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019), with "stepping" levels 6 |
| or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with *stepping 5 is |
| vulnerable to MDS variants*.) |
| |
| ``Skylake-Server``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS-noTSX`` |
| Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016) |
| |
| ``Skylake-Client``, ``Skylake-Client-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS}`` |
| Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015) |
| |
| ``Broadwell``, ``Broadwell-IBRS``, ``Broadwell-noTSX``, ``Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS`` |
| Intel Core Processor (Broadwell, 2014) |
| |
| ``Haswell``, ``Haswell-IBRS``, ``Haswell-noTSX``, ``Haswell-noTSX-IBRS`` |
| Intel Core Processor (Haswell, 2013) |
| |
| ``IvyBridge``, ``IvyBridge-IBR`` |
| Intel Xeon E3-12xx v2 (Ivy Bridge, 2012) |
| |
| ``SandyBridge``, ``SandyBridge-IBRS`` |
| Intel Xeon E312xx (Sandy Bridge, 2011) |
| |
| ``Westmere``, ``Westmere-IBRS`` |
| Westmere E56xx/L56xx/X56xx (Nehalem-C, 2010) |
| |
| ``Nehalem``, ``Nehalem-IBRS`` |
| Intel Core i7 9xx (Nehalem Class Core i7, 2008) |
| |
| ``Penryn`` |
| Intel Core 2 Duo P9xxx (Penryn Class Core 2, 2007) |
| |
| ``Conroe`` |
| Intel Celeron_4x0 (Conroe/Merom Class Core 2, 2006) |
| |
| |
| Important CPU features for Intel x86 hosts |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The following are important CPU features that should be used on Intel |
| x86 hosts, when available in the host CPU. Some of them require explicit |
| configuration to enable, as they are not included by default in some, or |
| all, of the named CPU models listed above. In general all of these |
| features are included if using "Host passthrough" or "Host model". |
| |
| ``pcid`` |
| Recommended to mitigate the cost of the Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) fix. |
| |
| Included by default in Haswell, Broadwell & Skylake Intel CPU models. |
| |
| Should be explicitly turned on for Westmere, SandyBridge, and |
| IvyBridge Intel CPU models. Note that some desktop/mobile Westmere |
| CPUs cannot support this feature. |
| |
| ``spec-ctrl`` |
| Required to enable the Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix. |
| |
| Included by default in Intel CPU models with -IBRS suffix. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for Intel CPU models without -IBRS |
| suffix. |
| |
| Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it |
| can be used for guest CPUs. |
| |
| ``stibp`` |
| Required to enable stronger Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fixes in some |
| operating systems. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. |
| |
| Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can |
| be used for guest CPUs. |
| |
| ``ssbd`` |
| Required to enable the CVE-2018-3639 fix. |
| |
| Not included by default in any Intel CPU model. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. |
| |
| Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it |
| can be used for guest CPUs. |
| |
| ``pdpe1gb`` |
| Recommended to allow guest OS to use 1GB size pages. |
| |
| Not included by default in any Intel CPU model. |
| |
| Should be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. |
| |
| Note that not all CPU hardware will support this feature. |
| |
| ``md-clear`` |
| Required to confirm the MDS (CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, |
| CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091) fixes. |
| |
| Not included by default in any Intel CPU model. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. |
| |
| Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it |
| can be used for guest CPUs. |
| |
| ``mds-no`` |
| Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is *not* vulnerable |
| to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] |
| CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). |
| |
| This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) feature rather than a CPUID feature, |
| so it will not appear in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or |
| guest. Instead, the host kernel uses it to populate the MDS |
| vulnerability file in ``sysfs``. |
| |
| So it should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not |
| affected} in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds`` file. |
| |
| ``taa-no`` |
| Recommended to inform that the guest that the host is ``not`` |
| vulnerable to CVE-2019-11135, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). |
| |
| This too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up in the Linux |
| ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest. |
| |
| It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports ``Not affected`` |
| in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort`` |
| file. |
| |
| ``tsx-ctrl`` |
| Recommended to inform the guest that it can disable the Intel TSX |
| (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature; or, if the |
| processor is vulnerable, use the Intel VERW instruction (a |
| processor-level instruction that performs checks on memory access) as |
| a mitigation for the TAA vulnerability. (For details, refer to |
| Intel's `deep dive into MDS |
| <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling>`_.) |
| |
| Expose this to the guest OS if and only if: (a) the host has TSX |
| enabled; *and* (b) the guest has ``rtm`` CPU flag enabled. |
| |
| By disabling TSX, KVM-based guests can avoid paying the price of |
| mitigating TSX-based attacks. |
| |
| Note that ``tsx-ctrl`` too is an MSR feature, so it does not show |
| up in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest. |
| |
| To validate that Intel TSX is indeed disabled for the guest, there are |
| two ways: (a) check for the *absence* of ``rtm`` in the guest's |
| ``/proc/cpuinfo``; or (b) the |
| ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort`` file in |
| the guest should report ``Mitigation: TSX disabled``. |
| |
| |
| Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hosts |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The following CPU models are preferred for use on AMD hosts. |
| Administrators / applications are recommended to use the CPU model that |
| matches the generation of the host CPUs in use. In a deployment with a |
| mixture of host CPU models between machines, if live migration |
| compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible |
| across all desired hosts. |
| |
| ``EPYC``, ``EPYC-IBPB`` |
| AMD EPYC Processor (2017) |
| |
| ``Opteron_G5`` |
| AMD Opteron 63xx class CPU (2012) |
| |
| ``Opteron_G4`` |
| AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU (2011) |
| |
| ``Opteron_G3`` |
| AMD Opteron 23xx (Gen 3 Class Opteron, 2009) |
| |
| ``Opteron_G2`` |
| AMD Opteron 22xx (Gen 2 Class Opteron, 2006) |
| |
| ``Opteron_G1`` |
| AMD Opteron 240 (Gen 1 Class Opteron, 2004) |
| |
| |
| Important CPU features for AMD x86 hosts |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The following are important CPU features that should be used on AMD x86 |
| hosts, when available in the host CPU. Some of them require explicit |
| configuration to enable, as they are not included by default in some, or |
| all, of the named CPU models listed above. In general all of these |
| features are included if using "Host passthrough" or "Host model". |
| |
| ``ibpb`` |
| Required to enable the Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix. |
| |
| Included by default in AMD CPU models with -IBPB suffix. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for AMD CPU models without -IBPB suffix. |
| |
| Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it |
| can be used for guest CPUs. |
| |
| ``stibp`` |
| Required to enable stronger Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fixes in some |
| operating systems. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models. |
| |
| Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it |
| can be used for guest CPUs. |
| |
| ``virt-ssbd`` |
| Required to enable the CVE-2018-3639 fix |
| |
| Not included by default in any AMD CPU model. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models. |
| |
| This should be provided to guests, even if amd-ssbd is also provided, |
| for maximum guest compatibility. |
| |
| Note for some QEMU / libvirt versions, this must be force enabled when |
| when using "Host model", because this is a virtual feature that |
| doesn't exist in the physical host CPUs. |
| |
| ``amd-ssbd`` |
| Required to enable the CVE-2018-3639 fix |
| |
| Not included by default in any AMD CPU model. |
| |
| Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models. |
| |
| This provides higher performance than ``virt-ssbd`` so should be |
| exposed to guests whenever available in the host. ``virt-ssbd`` should |
| none the less also be exposed for maximum guest compatibility as some |
| kernels only know about ``virt-ssbd``. |
| |
| ``amd-no-ssb`` |
| Recommended to indicate the host is not vulnerable CVE-2018-3639 |
| |
| Not included by default in any AMD CPU model. |
| |
| Future hardware generations of CPU will not be vulnerable to |
| CVE-2018-3639, and thus the guest should be told not to enable |
| its mitigations, by exposing amd-no-ssb. This is mutually |
| exclusive with virt-ssbd and amd-ssbd. |
| |
| ``pdpe1gb`` |
| Recommended to allow guest OS to use 1GB size pages |
| |
| Not included by default in any AMD CPU model. |
| |
| Should be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models. |
| |
| Note that not all CPU hardware will support this feature. |
| |
| |
| Default x86 CPU models |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The default QEMU CPU models are designed such that they can run on all |
| hosts. If an application does not wish to do perform any host |
| compatibility checks before launching guests, the default is guaranteed |
| to work. |
| |
| The default CPU models will, however, leave the guest OS vulnerable to |
| various CPU hardware flaws, so their use is strongly discouraged. |
| Applications should follow the earlier guidance to setup a better CPU |
| configuration, with host passthrough recommended if live migration is |
| not needed. |
| |
| ``qemu32``, ``qemu64`` |
| QEMU Virtual CPU version 2.5+ (32 & 64 bit variants) |
| |
| ``qemu64`` is used for x86_64 guests and ``qemu32`` is used for i686 |
| guests, when no ``-cpu`` argument is given to QEMU, or no ``<cpu>`` is |
| provided in libvirt XML. |
| |
| Other non-recommended x86 CPUs |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The following CPUs models are compatible with most AMD and Intel x86 |
| hosts, but their usage is discouraged, as they expose a very limited |
| featureset, which prevents guests having optimal performance. |
| |
| ``kvm32``, ``kvm64`` |
| Common KVM processor (32 & 64 bit variants). |
| |
| Legacy models just for historical compatibility with ancient QEMU |
| versions. |
| |
| ``486``, ``athlon``, ``phenom``, ``coreduo``, ``core2duo``, ``n270``, ``pentium``, ``pentium2``, ``pentium3`` |
| Various very old x86 CPU models, mostly predating the introduction |
| of hardware assisted virtualization, that should thus not be |
| required for running virtual machines. |
| |
| |
| Syntax for configuring CPU models |
| ================================= |
| |
| The examples below illustrate the approach to configuring the various |
| CPU models / features in QEMU and libvirt. |
| |
| QEMU command line |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| Host passthrough: |
| |
| .. parsed-literal:: |
| |
| |qemu_system| -cpu host |
| |
| Host passthrough with feature customization: |
| |
| .. parsed-literal:: |
| |
| |qemu_system| -cpu host,vmx=off,... |
| |
| Named CPU models: |
| |
| .. parsed-literal:: |
| |
| |qemu_system| -cpu Westmere |
| |
| Named CPU models with feature customization: |
| |
| .. parsed-literal:: |
| |
| |qemu_system| -cpu Westmere,pcid=on,... |
| |
| Libvirt guest XML |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| Host passthrough:: |
| |
| <cpu mode='host-passthrough'/> |
| |
| Host passthrough with feature customization:: |
| |
| <cpu mode='host-passthrough'> |
| <feature name="vmx" policy="disable"/> |
| ... |
| </cpu> |
| |
| Host model:: |
| |
| <cpu mode='host-model'/> |
| |
| Host model with feature customization:: |
| |
| <cpu mode='host-model'> |
| <feature name="vmx" policy="disable"/> |
| ... |
| </cpu> |
| |
| Named model:: |
| |
| <cpu mode='custom'> |
| <model name="Westmere"/> |
| </cpu> |
| |
| Named model with feature customization:: |
| |
| <cpu mode='custom'> |
| <model name="Westmere"/> |
| <feature name="pcid" policy="require"/> |
| ... |
| </cpu> |