/** @file | |
Enroll default PK, KEK, db, dbx. | |
Copyright (C) 2014-2019, Red Hat, Inc. | |
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent | |
**/ | |
#include <Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h> // gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid | |
#include <Guid/GlobalVariable.h> // EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME | |
#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h> // EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE | |
#include <Guid/MicrosoftVendor.h> // gMicrosoftVendorGuid | |
#include <Guid/OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix.h> // gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid | |
#include <IndustryStandard/SmBios.h> // SMBIOS_HANDLE_PI_RESERVED | |
#include <Library/BaseLib.h> // GUID_STRING_LENGTH | |
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h> // CopyGuid() | |
#include <Library/DebugLib.h> // ASSERT() | |
#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h> // FreePool() | |
#include <Library/PrintLib.h> // AsciiSPrint() | |
#include <Library/ShellCEntryLib.h> // ShellAppMain() | |
#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h> // gBS | |
#include <Library/UefiLib.h> // AsciiPrint() | |
#include <Library/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h> // gRT | |
#include <Protocol/Smbios.h> // EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL | |
#include "EnrollDefaultKeys.h" | |
/** | |
Fetch the X509 certificate (to be used as Platform Key and first Key Exchange | |
Key) from SMBIOS. | |
@param[out] PkKek1 The X509 certificate in DER encoding from the | |
hypervisor, to be enrolled as PK and first KEK | |
entry. On success, the caller is responsible for | |
releasing PkKek1 with FreePool(). | |
@param[out] SizeOfPkKek1 The size of PkKek1 in bytes. | |
@retval EFI_SUCCESS PkKek1 and SizeOfPkKek1 have been set | |
successfully. | |
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND An OEM String matching | |
OVMF_PK_KEK1_APP_PREFIX_GUID has not been | |
found. | |
@retval EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR In the OEM String matching | |
OVMF_PK_KEK1_APP_PREFIX_GUID, the certificate | |
is empty, or it has invalid base64 encoding. | |
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Memory allocation failed. | |
@return Error codes from gBS->LocateProtocol(). | |
**/ | |
STATIC | |
EFI_STATUS | |
GetPkKek1 ( | |
OUT UINT8 **PkKek1, | |
OUT UINTN *SizeOfPkKek1 | |
) | |
{ | |
CONST CHAR8 *Base64Cert; | |
CHAR8 OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix[GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1 + 1]; | |
EFI_STATUS Status; | |
EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL *Smbios; | |
EFI_SMBIOS_HANDLE Handle; | |
EFI_SMBIOS_TYPE Type; | |
EFI_SMBIOS_TABLE_HEADER *Header; | |
SMBIOS_TABLE_TYPE11 *OemStringsTable; | |
UINTN Base64CertLen; | |
UINTN DecodedCertSize; | |
UINT8 *DecodedCert; | |
Base64Cert = NULL; | |
// | |
// Format the application prefix, for OEM String matching. | |
// | |
AsciiSPrint ( | |
OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix, | |
sizeof OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix, | |
"%g:", | |
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid | |
); | |
// | |
// Scan all "OEM Strings" tables. | |
// | |
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol ( | |
&gEfiSmbiosProtocolGuid, | |
NULL, | |
(VOID **)&Smbios | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
AsciiPrint ("error: failed to locate EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL: %r\n", Status); | |
return Status; | |
} | |
Handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_PI_RESERVED; | |
Type = SMBIOS_TYPE_OEM_STRINGS; | |
for (Status = Smbios->GetNext (Smbios, &Handle, &Type, &Header, NULL); | |
!EFI_ERROR (Status); | |
Status = Smbios->GetNext (Smbios, &Handle, &Type, &Header, NULL)) | |
{ | |
CONST CHAR8 *OemString; | |
UINTN Idx; | |
if (Header->Length < sizeof *OemStringsTable) { | |
// | |
// Malformed table header, skip to next. | |
// | |
continue; | |
} | |
OemStringsTable = (SMBIOS_TABLE_TYPE11 *)Header; | |
// | |
// Scan all strings in the unformatted area of the current "OEM Strings" | |
// table. | |
// | |
OemString = (CONST CHAR8 *)(OemStringsTable + 1); | |
for (Idx = 0; Idx < OemStringsTable->StringCount; ++Idx) { | |
CHAR8 CandidatePrefix[sizeof OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix]; | |
// | |
// NUL-terminate the candidate prefix for case-insensitive comparison. | |
// | |
AsciiStrnCpyS ( | |
CandidatePrefix, | |
sizeof CandidatePrefix, | |
OemString, | |
GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1 | |
); | |
if (AsciiStriCmp (OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix, CandidatePrefix) == 0) { | |
// | |
// The current string matches the prefix. | |
// | |
Base64Cert = OemString + GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1; | |
break; | |
} | |
OemString += AsciiStrSize (OemString); | |
} | |
if (Idx < OemStringsTable->StringCount) { | |
// | |
// The current table has a matching string. | |
// | |
break; | |
} | |
} | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
// | |
// No table with a matching string has been found. | |
// | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: OEM String with app prefix %g not found: %r\n", | |
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid, | |
Status | |
); | |
return EFI_NOT_FOUND; | |
} | |
ASSERT (Base64Cert != NULL); | |
Base64CertLen = AsciiStrLen (Base64Cert); | |
// | |
// Verify the base64 encoding, and determine the decoded size. | |
// | |
DecodedCertSize = 0; | |
Status = Base64Decode (Base64Cert, Base64CertLen, NULL, &DecodedCertSize); | |
switch (Status) { | |
case EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: | |
ASSERT (DecodedCertSize > 0); | |
break; | |
case EFI_SUCCESS: | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: empty certificate after app prefix %g\n", | |
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid | |
); | |
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR; | |
default: | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: invalid base64 string after app prefix %g\n", | |
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid | |
); | |
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR; | |
} | |
// | |
// Allocate the output buffer. | |
// | |
DecodedCert = AllocatePool (DecodedCertSize); | |
if (DecodedCert == NULL) { | |
AsciiPrint ("error: failed to allocate memory\n"); | |
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; | |
} | |
// | |
// Decoding will succeed at this point. | |
// | |
Status = Base64Decode ( | |
Base64Cert, | |
Base64CertLen, | |
DecodedCert, | |
&DecodedCertSize | |
); | |
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); | |
*PkKek1 = DecodedCert; | |
*SizeOfPkKek1 = DecodedCertSize; | |
return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
} | |
/** | |
Enroll a set of certificates in a global variable, overwriting it. | |
The variable will be rewritten with NV+BS+RT+AT attributes. | |
@param[in] VariableName The name of the variable to overwrite. | |
@param[in] VendorGuid The namespace (ie. vendor GUID) of the variable to | |
overwrite. | |
@param[in] CertType The GUID determining the type of all the | |
certificates in the set that is passed in. For | |
example, gEfiCertX509Guid stands for DER-encoded | |
X.509 certificates, while gEfiCertSha256Guid stands | |
for SHA256 image hashes. | |
@param[in] ... A list of | |
IN CONST UINT8 *Cert, | |
IN UINTN CertSize, | |
IN CONST EFI_GUID *OwnerGuid | |
triplets. If the first component of a triplet is | |
NULL, then the other two components are not | |
accessed, and processing is terminated. The list of | |
certificates is enrolled in the variable specified, | |
overwriting it. The OwnerGuid component identifies | |
the agent installing the certificate. | |
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The triplet list is empty (ie. the first Cert | |
value is NULL), or one of the CertSize values | |
is 0, or one of the CertSize values would | |
overflow the accumulated UINT32 data size. | |
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory while formatting variable | |
payload. | |
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Enrollment successful; the variable has been | |
overwritten (or created). | |
@return Error codes from gRT->GetTime() and | |
gRT->SetVariable(). | |
**/ | |
STATIC | |
EFI_STATUS | |
EFIAPI | |
EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
IN CHAR16 *VariableName, | |
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid, | |
IN EFI_GUID *CertType, | |
... | |
) | |
{ | |
UINTN DataSize; | |
SINGLE_HEADER *SingleHeader; | |
REPEATING_HEADER *RepeatingHeader; | |
VA_LIST Marker; | |
CONST UINT8 *Cert; | |
EFI_STATUS Status; | |
UINT8 *Data; | |
UINT8 *Position; | |
Status = EFI_SUCCESS; | |
// | |
// compute total size first, for UINT32 range check, and allocation | |
// | |
DataSize = sizeof *SingleHeader; | |
VA_START (Marker, CertType); | |
for (Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *); | |
Cert != NULL; | |
Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *)) | |
{ | |
UINTN CertSize; | |
CertSize = VA_ARG (Marker, UINTN); | |
(VOID)VA_ARG (Marker, CONST EFI_GUID *); | |
if ((CertSize == 0) || | |
(CertSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader) || | |
(DataSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader - CertSize)) | |
{ | |
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
break; | |
} | |
DataSize += sizeof *RepeatingHeader + CertSize; | |
} | |
VA_END (Marker); | |
if (DataSize == sizeof *SingleHeader) { | |
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
} | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto Out; | |
} | |
Data = AllocatePool (DataSize); | |
if (Data == NULL) { | |
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; | |
goto Out; | |
} | |
Position = Data; | |
SingleHeader = (SINGLE_HEADER *)Position; | |
Status = gRT->GetTime (&SingleHeader->TimeStamp, NULL); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto FreeData; | |
} | |
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Pad1 = 0; | |
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Nanosecond = 0; | |
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.TimeZone = 0; | |
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Daylight = 0; | |
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Pad2 = 0; | |
#if 0 | |
SingleHeader->dwLength = DataSize - sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp; | |
#else | |
// | |
// This looks like a bug in edk2. According to the UEFI specification, | |
// dwLength is "The length of the entire certificate, including the length of | |
// the header, in bytes". That shouldn't stop right after CertType -- it | |
// should include everything below it. | |
// | |
SingleHeader->dwLength = sizeof *SingleHeader | |
- sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp; | |
#endif | |
SingleHeader->wRevision = 0x0200; | |
SingleHeader->wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; | |
CopyGuid (&SingleHeader->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid); | |
Position += sizeof *SingleHeader; | |
VA_START (Marker, CertType); | |
for (Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *); | |
Cert != NULL; | |
Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *)) | |
{ | |
UINTN CertSize; | |
CONST EFI_GUID *OwnerGuid; | |
CertSize = VA_ARG (Marker, UINTN); | |
OwnerGuid = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST EFI_GUID *); | |
RepeatingHeader = (REPEATING_HEADER *)Position; | |
CopyGuid (&RepeatingHeader->SignatureType, CertType); | |
RepeatingHeader->SignatureListSize = | |
(UINT32)(sizeof *RepeatingHeader + CertSize); | |
RepeatingHeader->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; | |
RepeatingHeader->SignatureSize = | |
(UINT32)(sizeof RepeatingHeader->SignatureOwner + CertSize); | |
CopyGuid (&RepeatingHeader->SignatureOwner, OwnerGuid); | |
Position += sizeof *RepeatingHeader; | |
CopyMem (Position, Cert, CertSize); | |
Position += CertSize; | |
} | |
VA_END (Marker); | |
ASSERT (Data + DataSize == Position); | |
Status = gRT->SetVariable ( | |
VariableName, | |
VendorGuid, | |
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | | |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | | |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | | |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS), | |
DataSize, | |
Data | |
); | |
FreeData: | |
FreePool (Data); | |
Out: | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: %a(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", | |
__func__, | |
VariableName, | |
VendorGuid, | |
Status | |
); | |
} | |
return Status; | |
} | |
/** | |
Read a UEFI variable into a caller-allocated buffer, enforcing an exact size. | |
@param[in] VariableName The name of the variable to read; passed to | |
gRT->GetVariable(). | |
@param[in] VendorGuid The vendor (namespace) GUID of the variable to read; | |
passed to gRT->GetVariable(). | |
@param[out] Data The caller-allocated buffer that is supposed to | |
receive the variable's contents. On error, the | |
contents of Data are indeterminate. | |
@param[in] DataSize The size in bytes that the caller requires the UEFI | |
variable to have. The caller is responsible for | |
providing room for DataSize bytes in Data. | |
@param[in] AllowMissing If FALSE, the variable is required to exist. If | |
TRUE, the variable is permitted to be missing. | |
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The UEFI variable exists, has the required size | |
(DataSize), and has been read into Data. | |
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The UEFI variable doesn't exist, and | |
AllowMissing is TRUE. DataSize bytes in Data | |
have been zeroed out. | |
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The UEFI variable doesn't exist, and | |
AllowMissing is FALSE. | |
@retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The UEFI variable exists, but its size is | |
greater than DataSize. | |
@retval EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR The UEFI variable exists, but its size is | |
smaller than DataSize. | |
@return Error codes propagated from gRT->GetVariable(). | |
**/ | |
STATIC | |
EFI_STATUS | |
GetExact ( | |
IN CHAR16 *VariableName, | |
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid, | |
OUT VOID *Data, | |
IN UINTN DataSize, | |
IN BOOLEAN AllowMissing | |
) | |
{ | |
UINTN Size; | |
EFI_STATUS Status; | |
Size = DataSize; | |
Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &Size, Data); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
if ((Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) && AllowMissing) { | |
ZeroMem (Data, DataSize); | |
return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
} | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", | |
VariableName, | |
VendorGuid, | |
Status | |
); | |
return Status; | |
} | |
if (Size != DataSize) { | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): expected size 0x%Lx, " | |
"got 0x%Lx\n", | |
VariableName, | |
VendorGuid, | |
(UINT64)DataSize, | |
(UINT64)Size | |
); | |
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR; | |
} | |
return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
} | |
/** | |
Populate a SETTINGS structure from the underlying UEFI variables. | |
The following UEFI variables are standard variables: | |
- L"SetupMode" (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME) | |
- L"SecureBoot" (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME) | |
- L"VendorKeys" (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME) | |
The following UEFI variables are edk2 extensions: | |
- L"SecureBootEnable" (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) | |
- L"CustomMode" (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) | |
The L"SecureBootEnable" UEFI variable is permitted to be missing, in which | |
case the corresponding field in the SETTINGS object will be zeroed out. The | |
rest of the covered UEFI variables are required to exist; otherwise, the | |
function will fail. | |
@param[out] Settings The SETTINGS object to fill. | |
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Settings has been populated. | |
@return Error codes propagated from the GetExact() function. The | |
contents of Settings are indeterminate. | |
**/ | |
STATIC | |
EFI_STATUS | |
GetSettings ( | |
OUT SETTINGS *Settings | |
) | |
{ | |
EFI_STATUS Status; | |
Status = GetExact ( | |
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
&Settings->SetupMode, | |
sizeof Settings->SetupMode, | |
FALSE | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
return Status; | |
} | |
Status = GetExact ( | |
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
&Settings->SecureBoot, | |
sizeof Settings->SecureBoot, | |
FALSE | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
return Status; | |
} | |
Status = GetExact ( | |
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, | |
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, | |
&Settings->SecureBootEnable, | |
sizeof Settings->SecureBootEnable, | |
TRUE | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
return Status; | |
} | |
Status = GetExact ( | |
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, | |
&Settings->CustomMode, | |
sizeof Settings->CustomMode, | |
FALSE | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
return Status; | |
} | |
Status = GetExact ( | |
EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
&Settings->VendorKeys, | |
sizeof Settings->VendorKeys, | |
FALSE | |
); | |
return Status; | |
} | |
/** | |
Print the contents of a SETTINGS structure to the UEFI console. | |
@param[in] Settings The SETTINGS object to print the contents of. | |
**/ | |
STATIC | |
VOID | |
PrintSettings ( | |
IN CONST SETTINGS *Settings | |
) | |
{ | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"info: SetupMode=%d SecureBoot=%d SecureBootEnable=%d " | |
"CustomMode=%d VendorKeys=%d\n", | |
Settings->SetupMode, | |
Settings->SecureBoot, | |
Settings->SecureBootEnable, | |
Settings->CustomMode, | |
Settings->VendorKeys | |
); | |
} | |
/** | |
Entry point function of this shell application. | |
**/ | |
INTN | |
EFIAPI | |
ShellAppMain ( | |
IN UINTN Argc, | |
IN CHAR16 **Argv | |
) | |
{ | |
INTN RetVal; | |
EFI_STATUS Status; | |
SETTINGS Settings; | |
UINT8 *PkKek1; | |
UINTN SizeOfPkKek1; | |
BOOLEAN NoDefault; | |
if ((Argc == 2) && (StrCmp (Argv[1], L"--no-default") == 0)) { | |
NoDefault = TRUE; | |
} else { | |
NoDefault = FALSE; | |
} | |
// | |
// Prepare for failure. | |
// | |
RetVal = 1; | |
// | |
// If we're not in Setup Mode, we can't do anything. | |
// | |
Status = GetSettings (&Settings); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
return RetVal; | |
} | |
PrintSettings (&Settings); | |
if (Settings.SetupMode != 1) { | |
AsciiPrint ("error: already in User Mode\n"); | |
return RetVal; | |
} | |
// | |
// Set PkKek1 and SizeOfPkKek1 to suppress incorrect compiler/analyzer | |
// warnings. | |
// | |
PkKek1 = NULL; | |
SizeOfPkKek1 = 0; | |
// | |
// Fetch the X509 certificate (to be used as Platform Key and first Key | |
// Exchange Key) from SMBIOS. | |
// | |
Status = GetPkKek1 (&PkKek1, &SizeOfPkKek1); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
return RetVal; | |
} | |
// | |
// Enter Custom Mode so we can enroll PK, KEK, db, and dbx without signature | |
// checks on those variable writes. | |
// | |
if (Settings.CustomMode != CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) { | |
Settings.CustomMode = CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE; | |
Status = gRT->SetVariable ( | |
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, | |
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | | |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS), | |
sizeof Settings.CustomMode, | |
&Settings.CustomMode | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", | |
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, | |
Status | |
); | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
} | |
// | |
// Enroll db. | |
// | |
if (NoDefault) { | |
Status = EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, | |
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, | |
&gEfiCertX509Guid, | |
PkKek1, | |
SizeOfPkKek1, | |
&gEfiCallerIdGuid, | |
NULL | |
); | |
} else { | |
Status = EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, | |
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, | |
&gEfiCertX509Guid, | |
mMicrosoftPca, | |
mSizeOfMicrosoftPca, | |
&gMicrosoftVendorGuid, | |
mMicrosoftUefiCa, | |
mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa, | |
&gMicrosoftVendorGuid, | |
NULL | |
); | |
} | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
// | |
// Enroll dbx. | |
// | |
Status = EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, | |
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, | |
&gEfiCertSha256Guid, | |
mSha256OfDevNull, | |
mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull, | |
&gEfiCallerIdGuid, | |
NULL | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
// | |
// Enroll KEK. | |
// | |
if (NoDefault) { | |
Status = EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
&gEfiCertX509Guid, | |
PkKek1, | |
SizeOfPkKek1, | |
&gEfiCallerIdGuid, | |
NULL | |
); | |
} else { | |
Status = EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
&gEfiCertX509Guid, | |
PkKek1, | |
SizeOfPkKek1, | |
&gEfiCallerIdGuid, | |
mMicrosoftKek, | |
mSizeOfMicrosoftKek, | |
&gMicrosoftVendorGuid, | |
NULL | |
); | |
} | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
// | |
// Enroll PK, leaving Setup Mode (entering User Mode) at once. | |
// | |
Status = EnrollListOfCerts ( | |
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
&gEfiCertX509Guid, | |
PkKek1, | |
SizeOfPkKek1, | |
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, | |
NULL | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
// | |
// Leave Custom Mode, so that updates to PK, KEK, db, and dbx require valid | |
// signatures. | |
// | |
Settings.CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE; | |
Status = gRT->SetVariable ( | |
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, | |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, | |
sizeof Settings.CustomMode, | |
&Settings.CustomMode | |
); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
AsciiPrint ( | |
"error: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", | |
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, | |
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, | |
Status | |
); | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
// | |
// Final sanity check: | |
// | |
// [SetupMode] | |
// (read-only, standardized by UEFI) | |
// / \_ | |
// 0 1, default | |
// / \_ | |
// PK enrolled no PK enrolled yet, | |
// (this is called "User Mode") PK enrollment possible | |
// | | |
// | | |
// [SecureBootEnable] | |
// (read-write, edk2-specific, boot service only) | |
// / \_ | |
// 0 1, default | |
// / \_ | |
// [SecureBoot]=0 [SecureBoot]=1 | |
// (read-only, standardized by UEFI) (read-only, standardized by UEFI) | |
// images are not verified images are verified, platform is | |
// operating in Secure Boot mode | |
// | | |
// | | |
// [CustomMode] | |
// (read-write, edk2-specific, boot service only) | |
// / \_ | |
// 0, default 1 | |
// / \_ | |
// PK, KEK, db, dbx PK, KEK, db, dbx | |
// updates are verified updates are not verified | |
// | |
Status = GetSettings (&Settings); | |
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
PrintSettings (&Settings); | |
if ((Settings.SetupMode != 0) || (Settings.SecureBoot != 1) || | |
(Settings.SecureBootEnable != 1) || (Settings.CustomMode != 0) || | |
(Settings.VendorKeys != 0)) | |
{ | |
AsciiPrint ("error: unexpected\n"); | |
goto FreePkKek1; | |
} | |
AsciiPrint ("info: success\n"); | |
RetVal = 0; | |
FreePkKek1: | |
FreePool (PkKek1); | |
return RetVal; | |
} |