| /** @file | |
| Security2 Architectural Protocol as defined in PI Specification1.2.1 VOLUME 2 DXE | |
| Abstracts security-specific functions from the DXE Foundation of UEFI Image Verification, | |
| Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, and User Identity policy for image loading and | |
| consoles. This protocol must be produced by a boot service or runtime DXE driver. | |
| This protocol is optional and must be published prior to the EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL. | |
| As a result, the same driver must publish both of these interfaces. | |
| When both Security and Security2 Architectural Protocols are published, LoadImage must use | |
| them in accordance with the following rules: | |
| The Security2 protocol must be used on every image being loaded. | |
| The Security protocol must be used after the Securiy2 protocol and only on images that | |
| have been read using Firmware Volume protocol. | |
| When only Security architectural protocol is published, LoadImage must use it on every image | |
| being loaded. | |
| Copyright (c) 2012 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> | |
| SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent | |
| **/ | |
| #ifndef __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__ | |
| #define __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__ | |
| /// | |
| /// Global ID for the Security2 Code Architectural Protocol | |
| /// | |
| #define EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL_GUID \ | |
| { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } } | |
| typedef struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL; | |
| /** | |
| The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image. | |
| This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI | |
| Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation | |
| invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in | |
| FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the | |
| appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the | |
| image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in | |
| these cases. | |
| If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected | |
| in order to support the User Identification policy. | |
| @param This The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance. | |
| @param File A pointer to the device path of the file that is | |
| being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging. | |
| @param FileBuffer A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image. | |
| @param FileSize The size of the file. | |
| @param BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If | |
| FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(), | |
| BootPolicy must be set to FALSE. | |
| @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL | |
| FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates | |
| that the DXE Foundation may use the file. | |
| @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath | |
| and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform | |
| policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in | |
| FileBuffer. | |
| @retval EFI_SUCCESS FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start | |
| UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath. | |
| @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not | |
| authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be | |
| placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file | |
| execution table. | |
| @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not | |
| authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE | |
| Foundation may not use File. | |
| @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no | |
| permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified | |
| by DevicePath. | |
| @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load | |
| drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The | |
| image has been added into the list of the deferred images. | |
| **/ | |
| typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION)( | |
| IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This, | |
| IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL, | |
| IN VOID *FileBuffer, | |
| IN UINTN FileSize, | |
| IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy | |
| ); | |
| /// | |
| /// The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL is used to abstract platform-specific policy from the | |
| /// DXE Foundation. This includes measuring the PE/COFF image prior to invoking, comparing the | |
| /// image against a policy (whether a white-list/black-list of public image verification keys | |
| /// or registered hashes). | |
| /// | |
| struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL { | |
| EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION FileAuthentication; | |
| }; | |
| extern EFI_GUID gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid; | |
| #endif |