)]}'
{
  "commit": "2b1eaff4992022b0929ca753be409cea69f56caf",
  "tree": "7f62a53de840bbdc275562c8d4dd892518ff596a",
  "parents": [
    "a2f979a300479a4ab68554d4b35664ed476cd7f0"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "Michael Brown",
    "email": "mcb30@ipxe.org",
    "time": "Wed Sep 02 15:27:57 2026 +0100"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Michael Brown",
    "email": "mcb30@ipxe.org",
    "time": "Wed Sep 02 16:36:41 2026 +0100"
  },
  "message": "[crypto] Add missing padding length check in RSA decryption\n\nRSA PKCS#1 requires a minimum of eight non-zero padding bytes for\nencryption.  This limit is currently enforced when encrypting but not\nvalidated when decrypting.\n\nThe only existing code path that can currently lead to RSA decryption\nis CMS decryption, which can use RSA to decrypt the cipher key.  With\nunderlength PKCS#1 padding (and hence an overlength plaintext), the\ndecrypted cipher key would be rejected by the immediately following\ncall to cipher_setkey().\n\nAdd the missing padding length check as part of RSA decryption, and\nadd a test case (imported from Project Wycheproof) to ensure that this\ncheck remains in place in future.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael Brown \u003cmcb30@ipxe.org\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "7d360784096571734128ec98e93451095d7625bb",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "src/crypto/rsa.c",
      "new_id": "af6a1414501dc8f99d0d9f14670a3feec029a026",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "src/crypto/rsa.c"
    },
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "d59637888725d1b1cdd8ff11f496f6b796ec0f03",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "src/tests/rsa_test.c",
      "new_id": "69f1d2f8e21b792d841d25a9f0b7f871eff79aa8",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "src/tests/rsa_test.c"
    }
  ]
}